Popular Legitimacy: A Tenuous Proposition by Pears, Emily
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 55 
Issue 2 Book Review 
Winter 2020 
Popular Legitimacy: A Tenuous Proposition 
Emily Pears 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Pears, Popular Legitimacy: A Tenuous Proposition, 55 Tulsa L. Rev. 277 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol55/iss2/20 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 65 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
PEARS, E - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:48 AM 
277 
POPULAR LEGITIMACY: A TENUOUS PROPOSITION 
Emily Pears*
HOWARD PASHMAN, BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY STATE: THE LEGAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF NEW YORK, 1776?1783 (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
PRESS 2018). PP. 192. HARDCOVER $90.00. PAPERBACK $30.00. 
GEORGE VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION (UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO PRESS 2017). PP. 400. HARDCOVER $30.00. PAPERBACK $20.00.
The classic, popular story of the American Revolution and Founding goes something 
like this: in a decidedly upright and legalistic fashion, America declared its independence 
from England, and the colonies cooperated to ultimately defeat that great empire in the 
Revolutionary War. At the war?s conclusion, the Articles of Confederation emerged like a 
phoenix from the ashes, fully formed. After a few years and Shays? Rebellion, it became 
obvious to all that the Articles required tweaking to ensure that less cooperative states 
would get on board. The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia presented those tweaks 
in the form of a new Constitution whose genius, legitimacy, and popular support were 
obvious from the outset to all but a stodgy few. 
Scholarly research obviously complicates that rudimentary textbook account 
substantially, but the basic sense still permeates that America?s was a legalistic revolution 
and that institutional legitimacy was bestowed, at each stage, automatically. Two recent 
books, Howard Pashman?s Building a Revolutionary State and George William Van 
Cleve?s We Have Not A Government work to reconstruct our understanding of how legal 
and institutional structures in those tumultuous years between 1776 and 1787 were viewed 
on the ground, by ordinary American citizens. As a result, each work shows how chaos, 
politics, and the people?s demands for change constructed America?s early republican 
institutions. Rather than emerging complete from the minds of great legal scholars, 
America?s institutional forms self-legitimize through an iterative process of public 
pushback and reform. 
Reading We Have Not A Government and Building a Revolutionary State together 
makes clear that legal and political institutions cannot be created in vacuums. Institutions 
that are imposed on publics unwilling or unable to uphold their central tenants will 
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ultimately collapse when tested. What is required, instead, is a public confidence, or 
attachment, to undergird institutional norms. When the people see the value of their 
institutional arrangements, when they have faith that their government will protect and 
serve them well, their support will prop up even those norms that seem to violate 
foundational principles. But institutions that attempt to exert power and authority without 
public support require, at the very least, vast military resources and leaders with strong 
stomachs for rebellion. 
Howard Pashman?s Building a Revolutionary State uses the example of a single 
state, New York, to investigate how the chaos and ?popular upheaval? of the 
Revolutionary War transformed into a relatively stable legal system at the close of the 
revolutionary period.1 The answer, he argues, lies in the popularity of property 
redistribution among a beleaguered and fearful wartime populace and New York?s
willingness to embrace such populist tools.2 The start of the war saw the destruction of 
colonial legal systems with little in the way of institutions, courts, or stable tools of 
governance to replace them. The first wave of legal authority from the provisional 
government came in the form of the Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies. 
At first glance, such a committee appears to signal an erosion of the rule of law, or at least 
a violation of the individual rights at the core of the revolutionary movement. In fact, 
Pashman argues, the Committee replaced ad-hoc vigilante citizen groups who already 
sought to rid their towns of apparently disloyal enemies.3 ?In this way, it generated popular 
support for revolutionary authority,?4 and as citizens came forward to help the committee 
identify Tories, ?they saw that revolutionary institutions worked for them and that central 
authority would address their urgent desire to suppress Loyalism.?5
The Committee?s methods of jailing and deporting British sympathizers ultimately 
proved unsustainable as overcrowding and returning prisoners revealed holes in 
institutional capacity.6 In the spring of 1777, as the war began to takes its toll on New 
York?s population, the state?s Convention appointed local ?Commissioners of 
Sequestration? to confiscate and auction off any property abandoned by British loyalists.7
The material relief and real goods Commissioners provided to a struggling population did 
a great deal to connect citizens to their Provincial Congress and interest them in its 
institutional authority. As Pashman writes, redistribution ?linked New Yorkers to the 
revolutionary project by giving them a vested interest in maintaining insurgent 
government.?8 Ultimately, New Yorkers became frustrated by the Convention?s restraint 
in redistributing material goods but not real property. In 1779, citizens began re-forming 
the lawless local committees that had allowed them to exact justice against Loyalists at the 
                                                          
 1. HOWARD PASHMAN, BUILDING A REVOLUTIONARY STATE: THE LEGAL TRANSFORMATION OF NEW 
YORK, 1776?1783, at 3 (2018). 
 2. Id.
 3. Id.
4. Id. at 42. 
 5. Id. at 45. 
6. PASHMAN, supra note 1, at 54. 
7. Id. at 65. 
8. Id. at 78. 
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start of the war, effectively bypassing the state?s nascent legal institutions.9
New York?s legislature finally responded to erosions in popular trust by enacting a 
forfeiture law in 1779 which dramatically increased property redistribution. ?[B]y 1783, 
the committee system had ceased, and New Yorkers accepted the legal authority of formal 
state structures, two changes that had seemed impossible only a few years before.?10 The 
forfeiture law, Pashman argues, turned anger and resentment into trust in and support for 
brand new legal institutions across the state.11 Ultimately, property redistribution helped 
to legitimize and fortify nascent political institutions in New York because it accomplished 
three distinct but equally necessary goals. First, property redistribution provided 
immediate relief to a suffering wartime population.12 Citizens respond to institutions that 
provide tangible benefits in times of need and recognize the utility of legitimizing those 
institutions with their support. Second, redistribution established ?moral authority.?13
Citizens who supported the revolution and suffered during the war wanted desperately to 
see their Tory enemies punished, and forfeiture laws sent a clear message that opposition 
to the revolutionary cause warranted moral as well as legal action. Finally, redistribution 
tied citizens? interests to those of the newly formed state institutions.14 Citizens who 
purchased forfeited property immediately acquired a vested interest in the survival of the 
courts and committees that granted them that share. Those bonds, built on material interest, 
lasted far beyond the war years and helped significantly bolster the legitimacy of state 
legal institutions. 
It is tempting to think of institutional legitimacy as dependent exclusively on legal 
validity or administrative efficiency, but such thinking belies the complexity of public trust 
and interest in times of great upheaval. Blunt tools, such as forfeiture laws and the 
establishment of committees to root out enemies of the state, look to legal scholars with 
the benefit of hindsight to be illegal, or at least to violate the principles and foundations of 
a Lockean republic. In reality, however, such actions can serve a valuable function for a 
regime that claims to rule by law and requires public support to do so. As my own work 
on political attachments has also suggested, legitimizing institutions requires a 
multifaceted approach to winning public sympathy and constructing deep and lasting 
connections between citizens and the institutions of government.15
Long standing public narratives about the legalistic nature of America?s revolution 
might lead us to conclude that forfeiture laws were ultimately enforced in an orderly and 
just way, but Pashman makes clear that was not the case. New York State singled out 
absentee defendants in prosecuting forfeiture cases, nearly guaranteeing default 
judgements.16 Pashman writes that ?as soon as the war ended, some of New York?s leaders 
                                                          
9. Id. at 86. 
10. Id. at 88. 
 11. PASHMAN, supra note 1, at 10. 
 12. Id.
13. Id.
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. See generally Emily Pears, Chords of Affection: A Theory of National Political Attachments in the 
American Founding, 6 AM. POL. THOUGHT 1 (2017). 
 16. PASHMAN, supra note 1, at 101?02. 
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tried to convince ordinary people that their revolution had been more fair, more just and 
rule bound, than it actually had been.?17 Hamilton, among others, suggested that it was a 
betrayal of the revolution itself to continue vengeful practices of confiscation and 
redistribution. But, as Building a Revolutionary State makes clear, those practices were at 
the core of what allowed revolutionary institutions to succeed. 
Pashman?s narrative, of legitimate legal institutions emerging from revolutionary 
turmoil as a result of the people?s desire for material relief and vengeance, highlights the 
importance of public confidence in constructing stable, legitimate institutions. One of the 
book?s strongest contributions lies in Pashman?s extensive archival research that 
highlights how a wide array of New Yorkers reacted to wartime upheaval and pressed their 
political leaders to take action against traitors to the revolutionary cause. Public demands 
and preferences do not always adhere to political principles or legal formalities but 
ultimately dictate the fate of any institutional order. 
George William Van Cleve highlights similar themes in We Have Not a Government.
His analysis of the Articles of Confederation?s loss of public confidence and ultimate 
political collapse demands similar attention to the interplay between public faith, 
institutional forms, and legal foundations. Having read Pashman, we should not be at all 
surprised to find, in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, an American public that is 
distrustful of institutions, seeks revenge against enemies, ignores established laws, and 
generally views the protection of private property as a principle of only secondary 
importance. This was far from the Lockean liberals we have come to expect among 
America?s founding generation. While New York managed to emerge from the Revolution 
with a surprisingly well-respected legal system, its institutions depended on the continued 
support of a fickle public. Van Cleve picks up where Pashman leaves off, providing a new 
and well-researched account of the policies and events that ultimately led to a loss of public 
confidence in the Articles of Confederation?s ability to govern a sectionally divided 
America. 
Van Cleve takes on past historical narratives of the post-revolutionary period that 
describe the Articles and the subsequent push for constitutional reform as either the result 
of imminent economic collapse, or a conservative effort to stymie an increasingly 
democratic system. Van Cleve instead argues that ?[t]he intractability of the 
Confederation?s problems stemmed principally . . . from growing sectional and interstate 
conflicts, often based on economic interest, as it confronted the massive challenges to 
America posed by the burdensome legacy of the Revolutionary War.?18 Political collapse, 
rather than imminent financial collapse, caused America?s leaders to lose faith in the 
Confederation?s ability to govern. 
We Have Not A Government begins with an analysis of the impact of massive 
Revolutionary War debt on late eighteenth century governance. A wide array of political 
leaders agreed on the need to maintain public faith by properly dealing with war debts, 
both domestic and international. But it became clear that public opposition to state taxes, 
                                                          
 17. Id. at 113. 
 18. GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 9?10 (2017). 
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state refusal to comply with Confederation requisitions, and overwhelming Federalist 
opposition to a direct Confederation taxing power meant debts would not be paid. As Van 
Cleve writes, ?in the final analysis . . . it was the self-interest of the states and their citizens 
that destroyed the 1783 proposals for Confederation taxation? and ?the states would 
continue to hold the nation?s financial future hostage to their individual interests and 
desires as long as the confederation survived.?19 State efforts to combat commerce and 
trade restrictions imposed by Britain further exacerbated sectional disputes and a growing 
sense that state interests would always predominate in confederation politics. Van Cleve 
argues that states were by and large able to raise tax revenue and pay for imposed trade 
restrictions, but refused to, because taxes were unpopular.20
The book?s second section highlights an additional arena of interstate conflict and 
Confederation political failure through a study of western settlement and emigration. The 
war?s peace treaty opened western lands to American settlement and emigrants, 
particularly from New England, flooded west. While the Confederation facilitated the sale 
of western lands and aimed to benefit from its profits, it failed to adequately protect or 
control settlers as clashes with Native American tribes and disputes over European-
controlled borders became commonplace. The Confederation showed significant 
weakness in failing to meet the political and institutional challenges of western expansion 
that again pitted state and sectional interests against one another. Institutional weakness in 
the west was particularly worrisome, given that settlers lacked any patriotic attachment to 
a state or nation.21
The Confederation proved itself unable to broker political compromises across 
sectional and economic interests. This was particularly true, Van Cleve writes, when it 
came to the Spanish treaty negotiations over Mississippi River navigation, which proved 
to be ?the most intractable political stalemate of the postwar period.?22 The Confederation 
Congress? inability to negotiate a deal that would re-open the Mississippi to American 
interests ?sharply increased interest in creating separate sectional Confederations to 
replace the United States? and ?markedly increased opposition to strengthening the 
existing Confederation.?23 Americans had not only lost confidence in the leaders and 
political arrangements tasked with their protection, but they had begun to lose faith in their 
union altogether. 
We Have Not a Government also focuses on popular movements and revolts in 
response to declining economic conditions in the lead-up to the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787. Van Cleve traces popular movements in support of debt relief and paper-money 
across the Confederation, but ultimately concludes that they had limited effects on the 
Confederation reform movement because both Federalist and nationalist leaders tended to 
oppose radical relief measures.24 Outside of states like South Carolina and Rhode Island, 
                                                          
19. Id. at 101. 
 20. Id.
21. Id. at 147. 
22. Id. at 185. 
23. VAN CLEVE, supra note 18, at 185. 
24. Id. at 212?13. 
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where there was significant legislative support for relief measures, ?state legislatures 
almost always responded to popular pressure for economic relief by balancing it against 
conflicting creditor and wealth-holder interests.?25 Popular support for debt relief 
primarily highlighted the danger posed by state popular majorities united against minority 
rights. Leaders across the political spectrum began to think differently about the 
Confederation?s power to control such majority abuses of power. That concern came to a 
head with Shays?s Rebellion in 1786. 
Van Cleve argues that like the Confederation?s lackluster response to conflict in 
western settlements, Shays?s Rebellion highlighted both the state and national 
governments? powerlessness in defending political institutions and the rule of law.26 Van 
Cleve highlights the opposing conclusions of Benjamin Lincoln and George Washington 
in the aftermath of the Rebellion. ?Lincoln wanted the Confederation divided because it 
was unable to enforce its laws and could not protect his section?s interests. Washington 
wanted a nation powerful enough to enforce its laws in a way that could surmount sectional 
conflicts.?27 In each case weak, illegitimate institutions that utterly lacked public 
confidence rendered any grand political bargain useless. 
The book?s final section traces state views in the lead-up to the Constitutional 
Convention at Philadelphia and highlights the process by which leaders came to conclude 
that reform was necessary. Even as state leaders determined that impotent Confederation 
powers required reform, they turned to face a more daunting problem: 
How could a central government obtain the support of its people to become an effective 
continental republic? On the eve of the convention, experienced political leaders still could 
not grasp how a national government could obtain obedience to its decisions by states (and 
their citizens) without using military force, the antithesis of republican government.28
That question?of how best to ensure public confidence and uphold institutional 
legitimacy without violating republican norms?sits at the very center of Pashman and 
Van Cleve?s studies. While both provide answers grounded in specific crises, their 
coexistence provides evidence that public trust and attachment requires constant tending 
for any republican institutions to long survive. Ultimately, Van Cleve argues that the 
Constitutional Convention overcame the problems of sectionalism and public confidence 
by ?provid[ing] for broad intersectional power sharing,?29 a devil?s bargain that required 
the creation of ?sectional distortions of politics before the Civil War caused by the three-
fifths clause.?30 That solution is not unlike New York?s recourse to requisition and 
redistribution to bolster weak state institutions during the war. Neither reflected pure legal 
theory or commitment to revolutionary principles, but both succeeded in maintaining the 
rule of law when political instability and a divided public threatened institutional forms. 
Institutions can win the people?s support in a variety of ways. Pashman usefully 
                                                          
25. Id. at 212. 
 26. Id. at 216. 
27. Id. at 218. 
28. VAN CLEVE, supra note 18, at 278. 
29. Id. at 286. 
30. Id. at 289. 
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highlights the way that Revolutionary institutions in New York solved basic human 
problems, demonstrated their value to the public, and then economically tied the people?s
interests to the government?s survival as a means of constructing deep and lasting 
attachments between citizens and their laws. Once convinced of the utility and legitimacy 
of their laws, the people voluntarily defended them, further reinforcing their public faith. 
Reading these two books in tandem highlights, however, that legitimizing 
institutions through public faith requires constant upkeep and maintenance. Attachments 
between the public and their institutions, once established, cannot be left to wilt. They 
must instead be tended to, providing perpetual reminders to the public of the government?s
utility, legitimacy, and goodness. Too often, in both the study and creation of institutional 
forms, we lose sight of the role the public plays in granting their power. When we study 
laws and ideas without reference to how they will be received by the people they govern, 
we miss the majority of the story of their efficacy. These books take on the significant 
challenge, particularly in historical research, of understanding how laws and institutional 
actions affected people on the ground, how those actions altered public perceptions, and 
how public confidence ultimately legitimized or undermined those institutions moving 
forward. 
